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Proves? I don't have to 'prove' anything. This distinction already
exists. All I have to do is show you that you're using the word 'art'
incorrectly. It amuses me that photographers want to call their work
'art' when that ('art') is of lesser value and importance than good
photogrraphy.
It's like bragging that your Porsche is a poodle. It's indescribably
stupid.
-------------------------------------------------
Part of Scruton's argument:
"1 ---
In order to understand what I mean by saying that photography is not a
representational art, it is important to separate painting and
photography as much as possible, so as to discuss not actual painting
and actual photography but an ideal form of each, an ideal which
represents the essential differences between them. Ideal photography
differs from actual photography as indeed ideal painting differs from
actual painting. Actual photography is the result of the attempt by
photographers to pollute the ideal of their craft with the aims and
methods of painting.
By an 'ideal' I mean a logical ideal. The ideal of photography is not
an ideal at which photography aims or ought to aim. On the contrary, it
is a logical fiction, designed merely to capture what is distinctive in
the photographic relation and in our interest in it. It will be clear
from this discussion that there need be no such thing as an ideal
photograph in my sense, and the reader should not be deterred if I
begin by describing photography in terms that seem to be exaggerated or
false.
The ideal painting stands in a certain 'intentional' relation to a
subject.[2] In other words, if a painting represents a subject, it does
not follow that the subject exists nor, if it does exist, that the
painting represents the subject as it is. Moreover, if x is a painting
of a man, it does not follow that there is some particular man of which
x is the painting. Furthermore, the painting stands in this intentional
relation to its subject because of a representational act, the artist's
act, and in characterizing the relation between a painting and its
subject we are also describing the artist's intention. The successful
realization of that intention lies in the creation of an appearance, an
appearance which in some way leads the spectator to recognize the
subject.
----------------------------------------------------------------
[2] See Franz Clemens Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint, ed. Linda McAlister (London and New York, 1973); Roderick
M. Chis- holm, Perceiving (London and Ithaca, N.Y., 1957), chapter 11;
and G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Intentionality of Sensation', in R. J.
Butler (ed.), Ana- lyticql Philosophy, Second Series (Oxford, 1965).
-----------------------------
The ideal photograph also stands in a certain relation to a subject. a
photograph is a photograph of something. But the relation is here
causal and not intentional.[3] In other words, if a photograph is a
photograph of a subject, it follows that the subject exists, and if x
is a photograph of a man, there is a particular man of whom x is the
photograph. It also follows, though for different reasons, that the
subject is, roughly, as it appears in the photograph. In characterizing
the relation between the ideal photograph and its subject, one is
characterizing not an intention but a causal process, and while there
is, as a rule, an intentional act involved, this is not an essential
part of the photographic relation. The ideal photograph also yields an
appearance, but the appearance is not interesting as the realization of
an intention but rather as a record of how an actual object looked.
Since the end point of the two processes is, or can be, so similar, it
is tempting to think that the intentionality of the one relation and
the causality of the other are quite iuelevant to the standing of the
finished product. In both cases, it seems, the important part of
representation lies in the fact that the spectator can see the subject
in the picture. The appreciation of photographs and the appreciation of
paintings both involve the exercise of the capacity to 'see as', in the
quite special sense in which one may see x as y without believing or
being tempted to believe that x is y.
---2---
Now, it would be a simple matter to define 'representation' so that 'x
represents y' is true only if x expresses a thought about y, or if x is
designed to remind one of y, or whatever, in which case a relation that
was merely causal (a relation that was not characterized in terms of
any thought, intention, or other mental act) would never be sufficient
for representation. We need to be clear, however, why we should wish to
define representation in one way rather than in another. What hangs on
the decision? In particular, why should it matter that the relation
between a painting and its subject is an intentional relation while the
photographic relation is merely causal? I shall therefore begin
by....."
(end of quote.....)
Alan Browne wrote:
> uraniumcommittee@yahoo.com wrote:
>
> >
> > ": the philosophy or science of art; specifically : the science
> > whose subject matter is the description and explanation of the arts,
> > artistic phenomena, and aesthetic experience and includes the
> > psychology, sociology, ethnology, and history of the arts and
> > essentially related aspects"
>
> And nothing in that, or anything you've posted proves that photography
> or a photograph cannot be art.
>
> Give it up Mikey.
>
>
> --
> -- r.p.e.35mm user resource:
http
/www.aliasimages.com/rpe35mmur.htm
> -- r.p.d.slr-systems:
http/www.aliasimages.com/rpdslrsysur.htm
> -- [SI] gallery & rulz:
http/www.pbase.com/shootin
> -- e-meil: Remove FreeLunch.
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