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Paul Furman wrote:
> To me, the more important aspect in a definition of art is whether it
> communicates some thoughtful emotional idea.
That has nothing to do with what makes something 'art'. This is some
vague generalization that says nothing substantive.
> Non-fiction is just as
> capable of being creative and evocative as fiction.
True, and irrelevant. It does not make them the same thing.
> I would agree that on a scale between documentation & abstract art,
> photography tends to be way over on the fossil side but it is a gradual
> scale and not a hard line.
No, wrong. It is a hard line.
> Most 'art' like paintings and sculpture are representational, using the
> given, known shapes of people and landscapes so those are really
> somewhere in the middle of the scale. If the criteria for art was that
> it be pure individual thought, that would only include abstract work,
> right? Music would be way over on the pure art end of things even though
> it has more to do with the body than the brain like pattern in a
> painting or photograph that just looks good without necessarily having
> any emotional or intellectual content. Then why is music so emotional?
>
> Bah, I'm done with this discussion, we are getting way off topic <g>.
Part of Scruton's argument, 'Photography and Representation'.
>From his book 'The Aesthetic Understanding: Essays in the Philosophy of
Art and Culture'
"---1---
In order to understand what I mean by saying that photography is not a
representational art, it is important to separate painting and
photography as much as possible, so as to discuss not actual painting
and actual photography but an ideal form of each, an ideal which
represents the essential differences between them. Ideal photography
differs from actual photography as indeed ideal painting differs from
actual painting. Actual photography is the result of the attempt by
photographers to pollute the ideal of their craft with the aims and
methods of painting.
By an 'ideal' I mean a logical ideal. The ideal of photography is not
an ideal at which photography aims or ought to aim. On the contrary, it
is a logical fiction, designed merely to capture what is distinctive in
the photographic relation and in our interest in it. It will be clear
from this discussion that there need be no such thing as an ideal
photograph in my sense, and the reader should not be deterred if I
begin by describing photography in terms that seem to be exaggerated or
false.
The ideal painting stands in a certain 'intentional' relation to a
subject.[2] In other words, if a painting represents a subject, it does
not follow that the subject exists nor, if it does exist, that the
painting represents the subject as it is. Moreover, if x is a painting
of a man, it does not follow that there is some particular man of which
x is the painting. Furthermore, the painting stands in this intentional
relation to its subject because of a representational act, the artist's
act, and in characterizing the relation between a painting and its
subject we are also describing the artist's intention. The successful
realization of that intention lies in the creation of an appearance, an
appearance which in some way leads the spectator to recognize the
subject.
----------------------------------------------------------------
[2] See Franz Clemens Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint, ed. Linda McAlister (London and New York, 1973); Roderick
M. Chis- holm, Perceiving (London and Ithaca, N.Y., 1957), chapter 11;
and G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The Intentionality of Sensation', in R. J.
Butler (ed.), Ana- lyticql Philosophy, Second Series (Oxford, 1965).
-----------------------------
The ideal photograph also stands in a certain relation to a subject. a
photograph is a photograph of something. But the relation is here
causal and not intentional.[3] In other words, if a photograph is a
photograph of a subject, it follows that the subject exists, and if x
is a photograph of a man, there is a particular man of whom x is the
photograph. It also follows, though for different reasons, that the
subject is, roughly, as it appears in the photograph. In characterizing
the relation between the ideal photograph and its subject, one is
characterizing not an intention but a causal process, and while there
is, as a rule, an intentional act involved, this is not an essential
part of the photographic relation. The ideal photograph also yields an
appearance, but the appearance is not interesting as the realization of
an intention but rather as a record of how an actual object looked.
Since the end point of the two processes is, or can be, so similar, it
is tempting to think that the intentionality of the one relation and
the causality of the other are quite iuelevant to the standing of the
finished product. In both cases, it seems, the important part of
representation lies in the fact that the spectator can see the subject
in the picture. The appreciation of photographs and the appreciation of
paintings both involve the exercise of the capacity to 'see as', in the
quite special sense in which one may see x as y without believing or
being tempted to believe that x is y.
---2---
Now, it would be a simple matter to define 'representation' so that 'x
represents y' is true only if x expresses a thought about y, or if x is
designed to remind one of y, or whatever, in which case a relation that
was merely causal (a relation that was not characterized in terms of
any thought, intention, or other mental act) would never be sufficient
for representation. We need to be clear, however, why we should wish to
define representation in one way rather than in another. What hangs on
the decision? In particular, why should it matter that the relation
between a painting and its subject is an intentional relation while the
photographic relation is merely causal? I shall therefore begin
by....."
(end of quote.....)
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